I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Université de Montréal (Montreal, QC, Canada). My areas of specialization are general epistemology, social epistemology, philosophy of medicine, and the philosophy of language.

I hold a doctoral dissertation on the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) and remain interested in the history of analytic philosophy.

My recent research in general epistemology focuses on two main areas: the problem of skepticism and hinge-epistemology approaches; and the phenomenon of irrational beliefs (particularly willful blindness).

In social epistemology, I am particularly interested in the normative foundations of categories such as "experiential knowledge" and "lay expertise." In addition to an individual project on the figure of the "expert patient," I am involved in two interdisciplinary research groups. The first, in social sciences, focuses on the experiential knowledge of people living in situations of social exclusion and poverty (in Quebec and Belgium). The second, in clinical research, is conducted at the Montreal Clinical Research Institute and focuses on patient involvement in research and improving care for people living with type 1 diabetes. I am also a member of the Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology Commission on Type 1 Diabetes.

In philosophy of medicine, my research focuses on the normativity of diagnosis, with a specific case study of (pre-clinical) diagnostic screening for type 1 diabetes.

My research mainly concerns the question of knowing what types of relations there are between our concepts of attitudes and intentional actions (in particular those of belief, intention and desire) and basic normative concepts like those of reason and rationality.

It is widely acknowledged that attitudes and intentional actions are governed by norms, but that is as far as the consensus goes. Are the norms of belief similar to those of action and intention? Are they at least commensurable? Do they have one or more common sources? Can they be explained using the same basic concepts? Is the existence of such standards compatible with some form or other of philosophical naturalism? These are some of the general questions that guide my research