My research interests concern the connections between Husserlian phenomenology, psychoanalysis (Freudian and some contemporary), and continental thought on sensibility. The thematization of sensibility and alterity, as found in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, in the formation of "I" and in some of sociality (notably that of Husserl on intersubjectivity) is the subject of current research.

I am also interested in Nietzsche's philosophy of forces in bodies, and his attempt to rethink European values. Finally, I am also interested in the distinctions between 19^th-century rational psychology in German speaking cultures (Herbart, Brentano) and Revolutionary psychiatry in France (Pinel, Esquirol, and later, Charcot, among others).

My research mainly concerns the question of knowing what types of relations there are between our concepts of attitudes and intentional actions (in particular those of belief, intention and desire) and basic normative concepts like those of reason and rationality.

It is widely acknowledged that attitudes and intentional actions are governed by norms, but that is as far as the consensus goes. Are the norms of belief similar to those of action and intention? Are they at least commensurable? Do they have one or more common sources? Can they be explained using the same basic concepts? Is the existence of such standards compatible with some form or other of philosophical naturalism? These are some of the general questions that guide my research